To what extent did diplomacy effect the rise of the modern state from Essay

To what extent did diplomacy effect the rise of the modern state from 1648-1815 - Essay Example 1997). This requires a less teleological view of the emergence of the modern state by placing far more emphasis on the interrogation of the ostensible and hidden motivations of the diplomats of each era, who after all were the catalysts for change in the political arena. The ‘Westphalian’ state arose from the chaos of more than hundred years of European power struggle and it was brought about by the fiscal and military exhaustion of the participants. The need to put an end to the human, financial and environmental devastation brought the parties together in a five-year long diplomatic undertaking, with the goal of establishing collective security and a balance of power. Agreement was finally reached in 1648 on a new configuration of Europe that curtailed the power of the Holy Roman Empire and increased the number of member states substantially to allow sufficient numbers of states to form alliances that would constitute a ‘balance of power’ to avoid future c onflicts. The Peace of Westphalia also empowered diplomacy to be the first and foremost means of maintaining security. Also enshrined in the ‘Westphalian peace treaties’ was the ideal that ‘state interests’ prevailed beyond all other reasons, based on the hope that princes would not let themselves be ruled by ‘disorderly appetites’ (Nathan J., 2002). It was thus firmly established that from then on, secular state interests were to be of primary importance and they were to be guarded by loyal, professional servants of this state, who were skilled in states craft and diplomacy. The underlying aim was to achieve that no one state could ever again gain supremacy. Many of the theories underlying the negotiations of Westphalia, had their origin in the politics of the Italian city-states but it was in Munster and Osnabruck that they were consolidated and shaped into rules and regulations, which from then on occupied politicians and theoreticians alike (Cruz, L. 1997). The value the Italians had placed on diplomacy had depended on ‘balance of power’, counteracting the dominance of Venice with the alliance of the remaining four states, under the watchful eyes of Lorenzo de Medici and Ferdinand of Naples, whose vigilance acted as ‘preventative diplomacy’ (Rucellai and Guicciardini in Sheehan, M., 2002). There were, however flaws in the system set up in 1648 that were not present in the Venetian, particularly in relation to diplomacy and the concept of ‘balance of power’, which in the much larger European theatre lacked clear definition and prominence. Most importantly, however, there was no diplomatic mechanism in place during peace times and no watchful group of sovereigns as there were in Venice (Treasure, M., 2003). This effectively meant that every act of aggression could directly lead to war, in the absence of a diplomatic charter that would prescribe arbitration and despite the fact that ‘recourse to arms was outlawed’, (Nathan, J., 2002) The treaties of Westphalia called for ‘great conferences’ in the case of impending conflict (Grotius cited in Nathan, J., 2002), but the ‘collective response’ was to prove problematic in the coming decades, as few states